Nope, it's a shift from one interpretive model to another
interpretive model.
> >The catch, though, is that while everything is subjective, we
> >(humans) form interpretive communities where we treat
> >interpretations "as if" they were objective. We look up at
the
> >sky and say "That's blue." Blue, of course, is subjective,
and
> >there's no way we could really "prove" that the blue I see and
> >the blue you see are objectively the same, but we've made a
sort
> >of compromise [the interpretive community] to agree that "The
sky
> >is blue" so we can talk about it and other blue things and not
> >spend all our time arguing what blue is.
>
> Well, there's the Newton/Goethe controversy here. Does the
particular
> frequency of a light wave determine color or is it determined
by how the
> subject perrceives it? I'd say objective blueness is provided
by the light
> wave while the blue that one sees is a subjective matter.
So, even if we were to grant you that last sentence, then the
argument could just move to whether "the light wave" is something
objective that could thereby provide "objective blueness."
Fish's point isn't that we quibble over these things endlessly
though. His point is that we are *situated* in *contexts* that
supply us with interpretive models to make meaning; the meaning
doesn't reside statically or objectively in a stable text (or,
presumably, experience as well).
What allows us to quibble in the first place is that we have
conceded the existence of things like "blue" and "light wave"
before the argument even began. Similarly, literary critics
would concede the ideas of things like "poems" and "metaphor"
before they started arguing for "this poem's interpretation".
Those contexts set up constraints that direct our communication
(we wouldn't, for example, argue that "blueness" is "caused" by
"moldy cheese in tj's fridge" because that would be outside of
the constraints of the scientific context of "causality"...which
serves us fairly well in most situations). Of course, we might
*legitimately* talk about "blue" being caused by "my baby done
havin' run off with another man", or at least as legitimately as
we talk about blue being caused by light waves...we've just
simply shifted the context.
> >Extending this to text, Fish argues that what formalists (who
> >roughly say meaning is embeded in the form of the text and can
> >be unlocked by the reader) are utterly wrong. Form is just a
> >function of reading within a certain interpretative model.
His
> >famous example of proving this is where he listed the names of
> >several theorists on the board as a reading assignment for one
of
> >his classes. The names were still on the board when the next
> >class--a 17th century religious poetry class--came in. He
told
> >the religious poetry class the names were an obscure 17th
century
> >religious poem and the class proceeded to spend the entire
period
> >building a critical analysis of the previous classes
assignment
> >*as if it were a poem*.
>
> Is this proof in an objective sense? I don't see how it proves
anything.
Fish definitely wouldn't say it objectively "proves"
anything...which isn't even his purpose, of course. What it does
is provide a different interpretive model from which to view "how
meaning comes from texts." The 'formalist' model would say that
words have objective meanings that are encoded by the author and
decoded by the reader, where as Fish's model says the meaning is
brought to the text by the reader and by whatever context the
reader is in when interpreting the text; shift the context (i.e.
from "assignment" to "poem") and the meaning shifts.
> Though it might say something about religious poetry students:)
>
> tj
>
> >Were they "wrong"? Fish would say no, because they made it a
> >poem by their act of interpretation. There cannot be a wrong
> >interpretation (because that would imply an objective right
one
> >out there that you could compare yours to).
Odd that you should stop right before the above paragraph,
because it seems your responses were all attempts to imply that I
was making the shift to an "objectively right" interpretation.
There is no such thing. There are merely different contexts;
right and wrong may exist *within* a context, but there is no
*acontextual* position you can take to argue objectivity from.
Here's a good quote from Fish that I'll end with:
"[M]eanings will be neither subjective nor objective, at least in
the terms assumed by those who argue within the traditional
framework [FIsh is talking about M.H. Abrams and E.D. Hirsch in
this instance --g]: they will not be objective because they will
always be the product of a point of view rather than having been
simply 'read off'; and they will not be subjective because that
point of view will always be social or institutional. Or by the
same reading one could say that they are *both* subjective and
objective: they are subjective because they inhere in a
particular point of view and are therefore not universal; and
they are objective because the point of view that delivers them
is public and conventional rather than individual and unique.
To put the matter in either way is to see how unhelpful the
terms 'subjective' and 'objective' are. Rather than facilitating
inquiry, they close it down, by deciding in advance what shape
inquiry can possibly take. Specifically, they assume, without
being aware that it is an assumption and therefore open to
challenge, the very distinction I have been putting into
question, the distinction between interpreters and the objects
they interpret. That distinction in turn assumes that
interpreters and their objects are two different kinds of
acontextual entities, and within these twin assumptions teh issue
can only be one of control: will texts be allowed to constrain
their own interpretation or will irresponsible interpreters be
allowed to obscure and overwhelm texts. . . .But if selves are
constituted by the ways of thinking and seeing that inhere in
social organizations, and if these constituted selves in turn
constitute texts according to these same ways, then there can be
no adversary relationship between text and self because they are
the necessarily related products of the same cognitive abilities.
A text cannot be overwhelmed by an irresponsible reader and one
need not worry about protecting the purity of a text from a
reader's idiosyncrasies. It is only the distinction between
subject and object that give rise to these urgencies, and once
the distinction is blurred they simply fall away."
Whew. I didn't mean to quote that much when I started typing,
but I seemed to need to keep going to make sure the point was
clear. Part of the problem here is that I've read the text
several times and you (apparently, to the best of my knowledge)
have not. I kind of feel like I'm trying to teach a class when
no one has done the assigned reading. :) With that in mind, I'm
going to stop trying to "teach" Fish to you all; if someone has
read or wants to read the book (_Is There a Text in This Class?_,
Stanley Fish, Harvard University Press, 1980, ISBN 0-674-46727-4)
I would love to discuss it off-list, but I am neither willing nor
very qualified to continue "lecturing" on Fish, at least not
without my "audience" being more familiar with the text than they
are :) If I keep this up, I'll wind up quoting the whole damn
book. :)
I *really* recommend the book, though. I think Fish inserts a
lot of sense into the often nonsensical deconstructionist
criticism. If these posts have at all challenged or interested
you, *read the book*.
:) Class dismissed. :)
-- Greg Ritter gritter@vcu.edu ritter@urvax.urich.edu http://www.urich.edu/~ritter